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JOSEPH NYE, JR.:  UNDERSTANDING  
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 
STUDY GUIDE, 2002-2009 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  IS THERE AN ENDURING LOGIC OF 
CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS? 
 
Outline 
 
A. WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS?  (3-4) 
 1. World Imperial System 
a. Western: Roman, Spanish, French, British 
  b. Regional Empires: Sumerian, Persian, Chinese 
 2. Feudal System 
  a. Crosscutting, Non-Territorial Loyalties and Conflicts 
 3. Anarchic System of States 
  a. Examples 
   1) City-States 
   2) Dynastic Territorial States 
  b. Absence of a Common Sovereign 
   1) Self-Help System 
   2) Thomas Hobbes: State of Nature 
  c. Domestic (Municipal) vs. International Politics and Law 
   1) Domestic Monopoly on the Use of Force vs. International 
     Anarchy 
   2) Domestic Sense of Community vs. Absence of a Common 
     Loyalty 
   3) Result: Gap between Order and Justice 
 4. This Last System Is the Most Relevant to Contemporary International Politics 
B. TWO VIEWS OF ANARCHIC POLITICS  (4-8) 
 1. Political Philosophy: Two Views 
  a. Thomas Hobbes: Emphasis on Insecurity, Force, and Survival 
  b. John Locke: People Can Make Contracts 
 2. International Politics: Two Current Views 
  a. Realism is the dominant tradition; it is more pessimistic: Hans 
    Morgenthau was a leading theorist 
b. Liberalism (often called idealism), the more optimistic tradition, traces 
back to Baron Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John 
Stuart Mill, and Woodrow Wilson 
 3. Presuppositions 
a. Liberals emphasize economic and social interdependence 
(1) They see a global society that functions alongside the states 
and sets part of the context for states (e.g., trade, the UN) 
b. Realists claim liberals overstate the difference between domestic and 
international politics 
4. Realist Rejoinder: “A State of War Does Not Mean Constant War” 
a. Sidebar: 1910 
5. Resurgence of Liberal Claims in the 1970s and 1980s 
a. Richard Rosecrance: States can increase their power either 
aggressively by territorial conquest or peacefully through trade 
(1) Illustration: Japan 
 6. Ecological Interdependence: Vision of a World Without Borders 
  a. Ozone depletion 
  b. AIDS and drugs 
  c. Richard Falk: non-territorial loyalty 
  d. Transnational forces are undoing the Peace of Westphalia 
 7. Realist Rebuttal 
 8. Other Approaches 
  a. Marxism 
  b. Dependency Theory [Cardoso changed to a free market view and 
    served as the Brazilian president] 
  c. Kenneth Waltz: Neo-realism 
  d. Robert Keohane: Neo-liberalism 
 9. Constructivists 
  a. Concepts are socially constructed [cf. medieval nominalism, 
    deconstruction, and Chomsky’s deep structures] 
  b. Focus on instrumental rationality 
  c. John Maynard Keynes’ dead scribblers 
C. BUILDING BLOCKS  (8-12) 
 1. Actors 
  a. States 
  b. Non-state actors 
   (1) TNCs or MNCs (multinational corporations) 
  c. Middle East as an Illustration 
   (1) MNCs 
   (2) IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) 
   (3) NGOs (non-governmental organizations) 
   (4) Transnational ethnic groups such as the Kurds 
 2. Goals 
  a. National security 
 3. Instruments 
  a. Stanley Hoffmann: Link between military strength and positive 
    achievement has been loosened 
b. Reasons 
(1) Nuclear weapons 
(2) Expense of conventional forces 
(3) Internal constraints 
(4) Alternatives to Force 
  c. Basic game of security goes on 
   (1) Hegemonic states 
   (2) Hegemonic wars 
   (3) New treaty sets the new framework of order: e.g., the Treaty of 
     Utrecht, 1713; the Congress of Vienna, 1815; and the United 
     Nations system, 1945 
D. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR  (12) 
1. Thucydides: The Father of Realism 
a. Strategos=general 
E. A SHORT VERSION OF A LONG STORY  (12-15) 
1. Initial Alliance of the Greece City-States during the Persians Wars 
2. Athenian Empire 
  a. Delian League 
3. Civil War in Epidamnus 
  a. Democrats sought help from Corcyra [the metropolis=mother city] but 
were turned down 
 b. Democrats turned to Corinth, an Athenian rival, but the Corcyreans sent 
a fleet to recapture their former colony and defeated the Corinthian fleet 
  c. Corinth declared war and Corcyra turned to Athens for help 
4. Athenian Dilemma: Break truce or allow a shift in the power balance? 
  a. Athenians pursued a deterrence strategy: show of force against Corinth 
    did not succeed in forcing Corinth to back down 
  b. Corinth stirred up problems in Potidaea, which was an Athenian ally 
  c. Sparta had promised aid to Corinth if Athens attacked Potidaea 
  d. Athens sent forces to put down an uprising 
 5. Great Debate in Sparta 
  a. Spartans voted in favor of war in order maintain the balance of power 
    by checking the increase of Athenian power 
6. War (431-404 BC) 
a. Peace of Nicias 
b. Disastrous Sicilian Expedition 
c. Four Hundred Oligarchs 
d. Athenian Defeat 
F. CAUSES AND THEORIES  (15-18) 
1. What Made War Inevitable 
2. Pericles 
3. Athens’ Security Dilemma 
  a. Security dilemmas are characteristic of anarchic organization 
 4. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
  a. Cooperation 
  b. Issues of Trust and Credibility 
 5. Balance of Naval Power 
 6. Question of Cheating 
G. INEVITABILITY AND THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE  (18-20) 
1. Belief in War’s Inevitability as a Cause 
2. Robert Axelrod 
a. Tit-for-Tat strategy 
3. Belief in the Inevitability of War Is Corrosive in International Politics 
  a. If you suspect your opponent will cheat, you rely on yourself 
 4. Thucydides’ View of Human Nature 
  a. Donald Kagan contends that Thucydides erred; Sparta feared a slave 
    revolt more than it feared Athens 
b. Kagan’s Conclusion: Precipitating Causes – Policy Mistakes by the Chief Actors 
– Were More Important 
6. Modern Lessons 
a. Be aware of both regularities and changes 
b. Beware of patently shallow historical analogies 
c. Be aware of the selectivity of historians 
d. Historians are affected by their contemporary concerns; consequently the 
questions they ask change 
7. The Cure to Misunderstanding History Is to Read More, Not Less 
H. ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  (19-20) 
1. Uses of Moral Arguments 
a. They move and constrain people 
 (1) e.g., Corcyra’s appeal 
b. They are used rhetorically as propaganda to disguise less elevated 
  motives 
(1) e.g., the Melian Debate 
 2. The Basic Touchstone for Moral Arguments Is Impartiality 
 3. Kantian Tradition (deontological emphasizes duties and rules) vs. the Utilitarian 
   Tradition (consequentialist); some add Virtue Ethics (aretaic) 
4. Moral Arguments Can Be Judged in Three Ways: 
a. Motives or intentions involved 
b. Means used 
c. Consequences or net effects 
I. LIMITS ON ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  (20-22) 
1. Weak International Consensus on Values 
2. Different Standards of Behavior: Private vs. Public 
a. Collective abstractions like the State not held to the same standard 
3. Complexity of Causation 
  a. Oxford Union debate, 1933 
  b. Hamburger argument 
 4. Order and Justice Are Both Important 
  a. Absence of institutions to preserve the order that precedes justice 
J. THREE VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF MORALITY  (23-28) 
1. Skeptics 
a. Example: Thucydides 
 (1) Melian Debate: might makes right 
b. Morality Requires Choice 
c. Criticisms: Some Choices 
   (1) Thomas Hobbes: balance of power 
   (2) International law and customs 
(3) International organizations 
d. Just War Doctrine in Wartime 
 (1) Answer to pacifism 
e. Why Complete Skepticism May Be Rejected 
f. Realists Who Are Not Complete Skeptics 
   (1) Emphasis on order 
   (2) Moral crusades disrupt balances of power [cf. Hobbes] 
g. Tradeoffs between Order and Justice 
 2. State Moralists 
  a. Example: Michael Walzer 
   (1) States represent the pooled rights of individuals 
  b. A Society of States with Certain Rules 
(1) Sovereignty: Good fences make good neighbors 
(2) Frequent violations 
  c. Intervention is a long-standing problem 
   (1) Examples of Panama and Kuwait 
 3. Cosmopolitans 
  a. Need to focus on distributive justice 
   (1) Problem of the “brain drain” 
  b. National boundaries have no moral standing 
  c. Limited cosmopolitan view looks at people’s multiple loyalties: 
   pluralism 
4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach 
  a. Trade-Offs 
  b. Outrage May Lead to Heightened Risk 
  c. The issues recur throughout history 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What Is International Politics?  Identify three basic forms of world politics.  Identify the chief 
varieties of the anarchic system of states.  What does the author mean by calling international 
politics “a self-help system?”  What is life like in Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature?  Identify two 
ways international law differs from domestic law?  With what result?  (3-4) 
 
2. Two Views of Anarchic Politics  Identify the two major traditions in thinking about international 
politics that in some ways began with Hobbes and Locke.  Who are some of the leading 
exponents of each?  What is the central perception of each?  What are some of the arguments 
pro and con?  Identify five other approaches.  How do constructivists differ from neorealists and 
neoliberals?  What is the practical importance of theories?  (4-8) 
 
3. Building Blocks  Identify three concepts that are basic to theorizing about international politics.  
How is each concept changing?  (For example, actors include not only states but also IGOs, 
NGOs, and transnational ethnic groups).  Identify three changes in the role of force.  What other 
factors may play a larger role than force?  How is the balance of power supposed to work?  
What are hegemonic wars and how are they resolved?  (8-12) 
 
4. The Peloponnesian War  Summarize the key events and circumstances that led to the Second 
Peloponnesian War.  What was Athens’s dilemma?  (12-14)  
 
5. Causes and Theories  What did Thucydides believe caused the war?  What was the view of 
Pericles?  What is a security dilemma?  What is the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario in game 
theory?  What was Athens’s security dilemma, as described by the Corcyraeans?  (15-17) 
 
6. Inevitability and the Shadow of the Future  What does Robert Axelrod believe to be the most 
effective strategy in Prisoner’s Dilemma?  What does it take to develop trust?  (Trust is the title of 
a recent book by Francis Fukuyama).  Compare Donald Kagan’s view of the precipitating causes 
with Thucydides’s theory of inevitability.  What three lessons may be drawn from this ancient 
history.  How did Thucydides’s questions differ from those we might ask today?  (17-20) 
 
7. Ethical Questions and International Poliics  How may moral arguments be used?  What views 
did the Athenians and Melians take in 416 BC?  With what result (p. 22)?  Contrast the Kantian 
(natural or intrinsic ethical norms) with the utilitarian (constructivist or consequentialist ethical 
norms) tradition.  Identify three ways moral arguments may be judged.  (20-22) 
 
8. Limits on Ethics in International Relations  Identify four reasons why ethics plays less of a role 
in international than in domestic politics.  Why is the “hamburger argument” unsound?  (22-23) 
 
9. Three Views of the Role of Morality  Identify three different views of ethics in international 
relations.  Which views do realists tend to take?  Idealists?  Give three reasons why the argument 
of skeptics is inadequate.  According to Thomas Hobbes, what does escaping the state of 
nature require?  What role may be played by international law and customs?   International 
organizations?  What takes priority: justice or order?  What is the problem with moral crusades?  
(23-26) 
 
10. What are the chief considerations for state moralists?  What circumstances might justify 
intervention?  What are the chief considerations for cosmopolitans?  What is distributive 
justice?  What are the strengths and weaknesses of each view?  What is the place of morality?  
[In the Morgenthau reading later, we will consider the issue of morality from a classical realist 
perspective].  What has changed since the time of Thucydides?  (26-28)    
 
Review 
 
world imperial system  feudalism   anarchy 
city-states   territorial dynasties 
anarchic system of states international politics as a self-help system 
balance of power  hegemonic state   nonstate actor 
NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)   Thomas Hobbes' state of nature 
John Locke    Immanuel Kant   Jeremy Bentham 
Athens's security dilemma moral crusades   strategos (general) 
Thucydides   Pericles   Prisoner's Dilemma 
Second Peloponnesian War Corinthians   Epidamnians 
Melians (Melian dialogue) Corcyraeans    realism 
reasons ethics plays less of a role in international than domestic politics  
dependency theory  liberalism   constructivism 
views of the role of morality skeptics   state moralists 
cosmopolitans   three basic forms of world politics 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  ORIGINS OF THE GREAT TWENTIETH-
CENTURY CONFLICTS 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. International Systems and Levels of Causation  What is an international system?  What are 
some of its intangible aspects?  In light of the issue of morality (p. 28), why are the unintended 
consequences of a system (such as the market system) important?  How did the existing 
international system affect Bolshevik behavior?  [Revolutionaries sometimes refer to the pattern 
as “co-optation,” which justifies destroy existing institutions].  What is the geopolitical view of the 
distribution of power among states, as understood by Kautilya and Machiavelli?  What accounts 
for a checkerboard pattern? 
(33-35) 
 
2. Levels of Analysis  Identify three levels of analysis.  What does Nye mean by 
  overprediction?  What is William Occam’s rule of parsimony?  (35-37) 
 
3. Systems: Structure and Process  Kenneth Waltz’s concept focuses on what aspect of 
  a system?  How does polarity affect the structure of a system?  What three elements 
  determine the process of an international system?  (37-38)  
 
4. Revolutionary and Moderate Goals and Instruments  What factors do constructivists 
  take into account?  What were the rules of the game in the eighteenth century (a period 
  defined in part by the Treaty of Utrecht)?  Why did states’ goals change?  How did the 
  Napoleonic Wars change the process?  What makes the French Revolution exogenous 
  to a structural theory?  How did technology change the means?  (38-39) 
 
5. The Structure and Process of the Nineteenth-Century System  What changes 
  resulted from the Congress of Vienna?  When did the big change occur?  Why did it not 
  produce instability?  What changes do constructivists point out?   (39-42) 
 
6. A Modern Sequel  How has the German problem changed over the years?  What made 
  possible Germany’s reunification?  Identify three ways things have changed.  (42-43) 
 
7. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy  How may the beginning of the Peloponnesian 
  War, the onset of the Austro-Hungarian War, and the end of the Cold War be understood 
  at the level of domestic politics?  How did Karl Marx and classical liberals like Richard 
  Cobden view the relationship between capitalism and war or peace?  How well did 
  Marxist and liberal theories account for the onset of the First World War and other events 
  based on domestic politics?  (43-44) 
 
8. Liberalism Revived  Why were liberal theories discredited?  What are the four strands of  
recent liberal thinking?  Why is trade important?  Illustrate with the case of Japan in the 
1930s, as noted by Eugene Staley, and recently.  According to neoliberals, why do 
international organizations matter?  How do institutions stabilize expectations?  What did 
Karl Deutsch mean by “pluralistic security communities?”  What circumstances might 
cause security dilemmas to reemerge in Europe?  (44-47) 
 
9. Liberal Democracy and War  According to Michael Doyle, why do liberal democracies 
  not fight other liberal democracies?  How does a plebiscitary democracy differ from a 
  liberal democracy? 
 
10. Definition of National Interests  Compare and contrast the realist and liberal views. 
(46) 
 
11. Variations in Foreign Policies  Besides trade and democracy, what other factors in their 
  Domestic affairs may explain different foreign policies?  (47-50)  
 
12. PowerPoint: The five crises of national development in the model developed by 
  Michael Roskin are identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution. 
    
1) Identity: tribalism, unassimilated minorities 
2) Legitimacy: dynastic conflicts, rebellions 
3) Penetration: poor integration, political and financial corruption 
4) Participation: electoral turmoil, one-party dominance, voter apathy or discrimination 
5) Distribution: class struggle, social and economic democracy 
 
Most emerging or developing countries are still trying to develop a national identity and unifying 
common culture of some sort. Many seek to redirect tribal loyalties to the central government and 
integrate (or oppress) unassimilated minorities. But the title of Samuel P. Huntington's last book, 
Who Are We?, shows that even a developed country like the United States is wrestling with this 
problem. Second: Are there disaffected groups that call into question the legitimacy of the 
regime? Mass public education and ethnic cleansing are rather different responses to the same 
crisis. Third: How effectively does the regime's rule extend over its territory? Does it assert 
effective sovereignty? Fourth: How well are people able to register their political views and 
demands? Are elections frequently accompanied or followed by riots or boycotts? Finally: How 
effectively, on the one hand, does the regime protect life, liberty, and property, and help 
regularize commerce within a civil society? On the other hand, how much does the regime favor 
some groups or classes of people over others and attempt to redistribute life's chances, including 
property and opportunities? This is a continuing problem for all regimes. Poorly-integrated 
countries are stuck in the third crisis.  But to some degree, kleptocracy (rule by thieves) is a 
common problem everywhere.  Transparency International evaluates the levels of corruption and 
relative transparency of countries around the world.  
 
13. Counterfactuals  What are they?  How may they be used to define causal claims? 
   Identify four criteria that can be used to test counterfactual thought experiments.  (50-53) 
  
Review 
 
system    Richard Cobden  Kautilya 
Prisoner's Dilemma  Prince Metternich   Congress of Vienna  
strands of liberal thinking 1870 unification of Germany Otto von Bismarck 
overprediction   Occam's razor   rule of parsimony 
neoliberals   expectations of stability   liberal democracies 
plebiscitary democracies structure and process  levels of analysis 
Marxist and liberal views of the relationship between war and capitalism 
poorly integrated countries Japan's behavior in the 1930s Eugene Staley 
ideologies of nationalism and democracy   Michael Doyle 
low-level generalization about variations in foreign policy  counterfactual  
examples of revolutionary goals and instruments 
the idea of popular sovereignty as spread by Napoleon through Europe 
Frederick the Great's seizure of Silesia from Maria Theresa 
the French use of the levée en masse instead of mercenaries 
the once popular notion in France that all monarchs should be executed 
 
Wars of German Unification (PowerPoint Slides): Review 
 
Carl von Clausewitz  Neville Chamberlain  Denmark 
Austria    France    Otto von Bismarck 
   
CHAPTER THREE:  BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR 
I 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Balance of Power  Compare and contrast David Hume’s, Richard Cobden’s, and Woodrow 
Wilson’s ideas about the balance of power.  Following the unprecedented Thirty Years War 
(1618-1648), the nine hegemonic wars that followed the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) were: the 
War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697); the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-
1713); the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748); the Seven Years War (also the Third 
Silesian War, 1756-1763); the War of American Independence (1775-1763); the War of the 
First Coalition against France (1792-1797); the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815); the First World 
War (1914-1918); and 
the Second World War (1939-1945).  Why do states balance power?  (58-59) 
 
2. Power  Define: power, power conversion, power resources, hard power vs. soft 
  power.  How has power been transformed in the age of information-based economies 
  and transnational interdependence?  (59-62) 
 
3. Balances as Distributions of Power  Identify three meanings of balance of power. 
   What is the hegemonic stability theory?  [Its opposite is the hegemonic transition 
  theory].  What dog did not bark in 1895 [over disputed territorial claims between 
  Venezuela and British Guiana]?  (62-63) 
 
4.   Balance of Power as Policy  How did Lord Palmerston and Winston Churchill articulate 
  and Sir Edward Grey practice the policy of balancing?  What is bandwagoning?  Why is 
  it risky in international politics?  Identify five reasons countries join the stronger rather 
  than the weaker side.  (63-65) 
 
5. Balance of Power as Multipolar Systems  What are the distinguishing features of a 
classical balance of power system?  How did the balance of power system following 
German unification break down?  Identify five periods in the nineteenth-century balance 
of power system [known as the Pax Britannica].  (65-67) 
 
6. Alliances  Why are alliances form and why do they collapse?  What were the hallmarks 
of Bismarck’s alliance system?  (67-68) 
 
7. The Origins of World War I  Identify some of the major international consequences of 
  the First World War.  (68-69) 
 
8. Three Levels of Analysis  What were the two key structural changes at the systems 
  level of analysis?  What role was played by: the Tirpitz Plan, the Boer War, the Crowe 
  memorandum?  When did Britain stop playing the critical role of balancer (maintainer of 
  the balance of power)?  What was the effect of the Triple Entente?  Identify four 
  changes in the process?  [Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn has a different insight into the “Dear 
  Nicky” letter, noting that Nicholas was deceived by two of his generals].  [Correction: 
  Herbert Spencer articulated the “survival of the fittest” philosophy].  (69-71) 
 
9. Why does Lenin’s imperialist theory fail to explain what happened at Fashoda in 1898? 
Who was threatened by the rise of nationalism in the Balkans and why?  Why did the Coalition 
of Rye and Iron favor German expansionism?  How did the personalities of Franz Josef, Count 
Berchtold, Nicholas II, and Wilhelm II contribute to the tragedy?  (71-74) 
 
10. Was War Inevitable?  What were the deep causes of the First World War?  The 
  intermediate causes?  The precipitating cause?  What was the Schlieffen Plan? 
   What possibly would have made its assumptions obsolete by 1916?  (74-77) 
 
11. What Kind of War?  Counterfactually, what four other wars were possible? [Incidentally, 
  United States entry into the war came shortly after the British intercepted the 
  Zimmermann note, which offered Mexico incentives to ally itself with Germany if the 
  Americans entered the war].  What three lessons does the author draw?  (77-81) 
 
APPENDICES:  OTHER TAKES ON THESE ISSUES 
 
1. Eyre Crowe, Memorandum, January 1, 1907 
 
Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime 
ascendancy, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the 
existence of England; Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and thinking 
for the present merely of using her legitimate position and influence as one of the 
leading Powers in the council of nations, is seeking to promote her foreign commerce, 
spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope of her national energies, and 
create fresh German interests all over the world wherever and whenever a peaceful 
opportunity offers. . . . It will, however, be seen, upon reflection, that there is no actual 
necessity for a British Government to determine definitely which of the two theories of 
German policy it will accept.  For it is clear that the second scheme (of semi-
independent evolution, not entirely unaided by statecraft) may at any stage merge into 
the first, or conscious-design scheme.  Moreover, if ever the evolution scheme should 
come to be realized, the position thereby accruing to Germany would obviously 
constitute as formidable a menace to the rest of the world as would be presented by any 
deliberate conquest of a similar position by “malice aforethought.” 
 
2. Donald Kagan 
 
Bismarck’s unification of the Germans under the leadership of Prussia was an 
astonishing achievement.  His ability to solidify the place of the new and threatening 
entity in a European system shattered by its emergence and to create a new 
international order in which Germany could live in peace and prosper may have been 
even more remarkable.  For the two decades after 1871 that he remained in power 
there were no wars among the great powers.  Even after he was dismissed in 1890 by 
the new German emperor, William II, it took his successors another quarter of a century 
to undo and reverse his policies and so distort the system he created as to produce a 
major war. 
 
Bismarck’s second great achievement rested, in part, on Germany’s strong military and 
industrial power, which gave his policies weight and respect. . . . Central to his goal was 
the need to convince the other powers that Germany was what he repeatedly asserted: 
a “saturated” power that needed to turn inward to consolidate in peace what had been 
gained in three swift wars. 
 
[Following the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, the first and most important part of 
Bismarck’s system to be sacrificed was a flexible accommodation (the Reinsurance 
Treaty) with the Russians that kept them isolated from France and kept Germany from 
becoming too closely linked to Austrian ambitions.  A few years later the two-front 
Schlieffen Plan grew in response to a Franco-Russian alliance that Bismarck had so 
skillfully prevented]. 
 
3. David W. Ziegler 
 
German preparation for war followed the Schlieffen Plan, which rested on several 
assumptions.  One was that any major war in Europe would be for the Germans a two-
front war, against Russia in the east and France in the west.  Another assumption was 
that the huge Russian army would be impossible to defeat; the most the Germans could 
hope to do would be to keep the Russian army from defeating them.  The one 
advantage that the Germans had, the Schlieffen Plan assumed, was technological 
superiority, particularly the ability to mobilize quickly.  They assumed they could 
mobilize in two weeks; the Russians, with more territory and a less-developed railroad 
network, would need six weeks.  Therefore, the Schlieffen Plan called for a major 
offensive first against France, to knock it out of the war before turning the German army 
to the more difficult task of fighting the Russian army.  For this reason, the Russian 
mobilization was greeted with alarm in Berlin.  If the Schlieffen Plan were to work (and 
for all practical purposes it was the only plan the Germans had), then it was essential 
that the Germans begin mobilizing as soon as the Russians did.  Otherwise they would 
lose the advantage afforded them by their superior technology.  Never mind that the 
Russian mobilization was directed against Austria.  The crucial factor, in German eyes, 
was mobilization. 
 
Thus when the Germans in their turn delivered an ultimatum to Russia on July 31, 
demanding that they demobilize, it was not so much in defense of Austria as in defense 
of their own strategic situation.  When Russia  declined to demobilize, the Germans 
mobilized.  The French, realizing what was coming, did so too. . . . 
 
The connecting thread, from the assassination in Sarajevo to the German attack on 
France, was military planning. 
 
4. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn: 
 
[At the end of the war the Reichstag appointed a commission to determine responsibility 
for the war.  Dr. Arthur Rosenberg, a Social Democrat who headed the commission, 
exonerated Wilhelm II almost completely.  Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn describes the 
emperor as] a gifted but rather loud-mouthed and most undiplomatic ruler. . . . He was a 
victim of too much adulation and misinformation, but was by no means a villain, as 
Walter Rathenau has pointed out. . . . 
 
Harry Elmer Barnes, an American historian who tried to assess the guilt for this silliest 
of all major wars, named Serbia first, Russia second, Austria-Hungary third, France 
fourth, the German Reich fifth, and Britain sixth.  What could have been a local 
intervention by Austria-Hungary against Serbia was transformed into a pan-European 
war by the actions of two Russians, War Minister Sukhomlinov and General 
Yanushyévich, chief of the Russian general staff.  They lied constantly to their emperor 
about their mobilization not only along the Austrian, but also along the German frontier.  
An exchange of telegrams between “Willy” and “Nicky” (unfortunately, there was no “hot 
line” yet) caused the Kaiser to believe that his cousin and friend was trying to deceive 
him.  He thereupon declared war on Russia.  (Footnote: The Bolsheviks tried 
Yanushkievitch and Sukhomlinov in 1918 – at that time a fair trial was still possible.  
Both insisted that they had acted as patriots.  In retrospect it become clear that they 
acted less as patriots than as faithful servants of France.  Lord Grey was very right 
when he wrote: “Let it never be forgotten that it was the energy and tremendous 
sacrifice with which Russia made this advance [i.e. into East Prussia] that saved the 
Allies in the summer of 1914. . . . The whole-hearted efforts and all the strength of 
Russia were needed in the early stages to save the Allies”).  Russia was tied to France 
by a military alliance; and thus began a war that could have been ended by a 
compromise as late as 1917, which would have saved us the misery Europe has been 
living in ever since.  But the American intervention made compromise impossible.  The 
Germans, most of the time victorious in this war about Austria-Hungary, were forced to 
their knees primarily by the hunger blockade. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
AND WORLD WAR II 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. The League of Nations  What change was Woodrow Wilson determined to introduce into the 
international system (which is reflected in his famous 14 Points)?  Identify the three major points 
of the collective security system?  Identify three ways in which it differed from the balance of 
power approach.  What were some of the ambiguities in the Covenant of the League of Nations?  
What was its understanding of international law?  (85-88) 
 
2. The United States and the League of Nations  [American opponents of the Versailles 
  Treaty were divided into two camps: reservationists and irreconcilables].  Henry Cabot 
  Lodge, a political ally of the late Theodore Roosevelt, led the reservationists. 
   [Intellectual animosity long characterized the relationship between Wilson and Lodge]. 
 (88-89) 
    
3. The Early Days of the League  What did the French want?  The British?  Why did the 
  French form alliances with Poland and the Little Entente?  What was the state of 
  Germany after the war?  How did the Versailles Treaty make things worse?  Why were 
  the Italians unhappy with the peace (consider the Treaty of London)?  What 
commitments did Germany make in the Treaty of Locarno?  What was the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact? (89-90) 
 
4. The Manchurian Failure, the Ethiopian Debacle  Why did collective security fail in 
  Manchuria and Ethiopia?  [Discrimination against Japan by the United States in the 
  Washington Conference’s 5:5:3:1:1 formula for postwar naval size was also a sore point]. 
   Why did the sanctions against Italy finally take a back seat in 1936?  [The Haitian 
  delegate showed a real understanding of Thomas Hobbes’s point about equality in the 
  state of nature].  (90-93) 
 
5. Hitler’s War?  How was the German problem solved after the Second World War?  What 
  kind of war did Hitler want?  What is the significance of the Hossbach memorandum? 
 (93-95) 
 
6.   Hitler’s Strategy  What were Hitler’s four options when he came to power in 1933? 
    Identify the four phases in which he pursued the fourth option.  How did Hitler 
  outmaneuver his foes at Stresa and in the Rhineland?  [The Anschluss is the name given 
  Hitler’s seizure of Austria in 1938].  What excuse did Hitler use to justify seizing the 
  Sudetenland?  The Munich Conference is now synonymous with the word 
  “appeasement” (see pp. 107-08).  Hitler’s “brilliant diplomatic coup” (p. 97) was the 
  Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an alliance of two predatory regimes.  The seizure of western 
  Poland in September 1939 was followed by the “Phony War,” which lasted until May. 
   But neither the Russians, who had seized eastern Poland in mid-September, nor the 
  Germans were quiet.  Russia annexed the Baltic states, then invaded Finland at the end 
  of November, resulting in its expulsion from the League of Nations.  The Phony War 
  became a shooting war in the West when the Germans seized Denmark and Norway in 
  April and then launched the Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France in May.  All 
  through this period Hitler monopolized the initiative; his foes merely reacted.  The real 
  issue is: Why did Hitler finally fail?  (95-98) 
 
7. The Role of the Individual  What aspects of Hitler’s personality brought on global war 
  and failure?  How did he misjudge the United States?  (98-99) 
 
8. Systemic and Domestic Causes  At the structural level, what made the Versailles 
  Treaty too harsh and too lenient at the same time (here analogies might be made with 
  the conclusion of the Gulf War)?  Identify three domestic-level changes.  Food for 
 thought: What domestic-level factors shape American policy today?  How do the 
 various causes fit together?  (99-101) 
 
9. Was War Inevitable?  What might the Western democracies have done differently? 
  When did war become virtually inevitable?  (102-03) 
 
10. The Pacific War  What was the economic and political context in which Japan began 
 to impose its East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?  After Japan’s seizure of French Indochina 
  following the fall of France, what three options could the militarists have exercised?  Why 
  did they choose to move against the United States? B How did the three levels of 
  analysis work together?  (99-103) 
 
11. Appeasement and Two Types of War  In the author’s judgment, when was 
  appeasement appropriate?  Inappropriate?  (103-04) 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  THE COLD WAR 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Deterrence and Containment  Distinguish between deterrence and containment.  Give 
examples of each.  (112-13) 
 
2. Three Approaches to the Cold War  Identify the three main schools of opinion on the causes 
of the Cold War.  What evidence does each school of opinion cite in favor of its view?  How do 
hard revisionists differ from soft revisionists?  Basically, what view does John Lewis Gaddis 
take today?  (114-16) 
 
3. Roosevelt’s Policies, Stalin’s Policies  Why did Roosevelt demand unconditional surrender?  
What are some examples of Soviet pragmatism during the war?  (116-18) 
 
4. Phases of the Conflict  Identify the six issues that contributed to the eventual change 
from Roosevelt’s strategy to the onset of the Cold War.  What happened to the lend-lease aid 
program?  From Kennan’s and Litvinov’s perspectives, why would appeasement have failed to 
work?  What did Kennan object to in the Truman Doctrine?  What was the rationale for the 
Marshall Plan?  What caused Truman finally to sign NSC-68 in June 1950?  (118-23) 
 
5. Levels of Analysis  What did Alexis de Tocqueville predict (in 1835)? 
 
There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from 
different points, but seem to tend towards the same end.  I allude to the Russians 
and the Americans. . . . All other nations seem to have nearly reached their 
natural limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the 
act of growth.  All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme 
difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which 
no limited can be perceived. . . . The American struggles against the obstacles 
which nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men.  The 
former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its 
arms. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, 
and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; 
the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm.  The principal 
instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude.  Their starting-point is 
different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked 
out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.”  -- Democracy 
in America, vol. 1 
 
 What changed between the two powers after the war?  What were the two roots of Soviet 
  foreign policy?  Identify four peculiarities of Russian political culture.  What did the 
  communist system add?  Identify four peculiarities of American political culture.  How has 
  the affected the American foreign policy process [which is often described as oscillating 
  between introversion and extroversion]?  (123-27) 
 
6. U.S. and Soviet Goals in the Cold War  Distinguish between possession goals and 
  milieu goals.  How did Soviet expansionism differ from Hitler’s?  Is there evidence of a 
  more threatening nature?  What was George Kennan’s idea of containment?  What 
  was the rationale for American aid to Yugoslavia?  What change after the Korean War? 
   What were some signs of a thaw in the Cold War after Stalin’s death?  Why did 
  Khrushchev’s approach fail?  What was détente?  How did the Nixon Administration 
  make use of it as a means to pursue the goals of containment?  Identify three trends in 
  the 1970s that undercut it?  (127-31) 
 
7. The End of the Cold War  Identify some of the explanations for the end of the Cold War. 
   Why was an individual, Mikhail Gorbachev, the most important precipitating cause?  [A 
  case can be made for adding Ronald Reagan].  How did Gorbachev’s policies, glasnost, 
  perestroika, and the new thinking, contribute to the Soviet collapse?  [The 1980s arms 
  race also contributed].  What was the role of liberal ideas and what Paul Kennedy calls 
  imperial overstretch?  What are some of the evidences of a loss of legitimacy? 
    Identify some deeper consequences of de-Stalinization in 1956, repressive measures in 
  the Soviet empire, and Soviet incompetence in face of the creative destruction (Joseph 
 Schumpeter’s term) of capitalism?  What were the effects of IMF shock therapy?  (131-36) 
 
8. Physics and Politics  What was the Baruch Plan?  Identify five significant political 
  effects of the H-bomb.  (136-39) 
 
9. Balance of Terror, Problems of Nuclear Deterrence   What made bipolarity a 
  particularly stable type of system?  What is the reasoning behind nuclear deterrence 
(especially in the context of a second-strike capability)?  What accounts for early self-restraint?   
(139-41) 
 
10. The Cuban Missile Crisis  Identify various views that attempt to account for the peaceful 
  resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  What were the American options?  How did its 
  resolution a compromise?  (141-43) 
 
11. How could nuclear war fit the just war theory?  What are some of the continuing 
concerns about the potential use of nuclear weapons?  (143-46) 
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CHAPTER SIX:  INTERVENTION, INSTITUTIONS, REGIONAL 
AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Ethnic Conflicts, Intervention and Sovereignty  Identify: ethnic wars, failed states.  Why would 
constructivism attribute ethnic conflict to a Freudian “narcissism of small differences?”  Political 
entrepreneurs seek to shape or reconstruct the political identity of political groups.  For example:  
Russell Kirk published a work, The Conservative Mind (1953), that helped articulate and name 
the conservative intellectual and political movement.  Subsequently it has been shaped and 
reshaped by various policy entrepreneurs, some of whom would have read him out of the 
movement.  Why is nonintervention a powerful norm of international law?  Illustrate some of the 
forms intervention may take, as in the case of economic assistance, electioneering, and the 
sending of military advisers?  What makes intervention hard to define?  (153-59) 
 
2. Sovereignty, Judging Intervention  Under the Westphalian (1648) system, what are 
  some of the factors that set practical limits on sovereignty?  How do realists, 
  cosmopolitans, and state moralists differ in their views of intervention?  Which school of 
  thought is most apt to support humanitarian intervention?  What were the Brezhnev 
  Doctrine [the Soviet Union committed itself to prevent any parts of its empire from 
  seceding or being overthrown] and the Reagan Doctrine?  A book entitled Reagan’s War 
  argues that Ronald Reagan made the defeat of Communism the central goal of his 
Administration, capping his own decades-long struggle against Communism in Hollywood 
and public life.  (159-61) 
 
3.   Exceptions to the Rule  Identify Michael Walzer’s four situations in which war or military 
  intervention may be justified.  What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of these 
  arguments?  (161-62) 
 
4. Problems of Self-Determination  What are some of the problems with intervention on 
  behalf of secessionist movements?  Why is the question of voting (in a plebiscite) so 
  complicated?  Why did Biafra’s secession (1967-1970) create a problem for the rest of 
  Nigeria?  What factors complicated the issue of how to respond to ethnic cleansing in 
  Bosnia?  Why then is self-determination “an ambiguous moral principle?”  (162-64) 
 
5. Motives, Means, and Consequences  What are the three dimensions of judgment 
  associated with the just war tradition?  Why did George Kennan become disillusioned 
  with containment?  (158-61) 
 
6. Domestic Analogies, Predictability and Legitimacy  Why is international organization 
  not an incipient world government?  How does international law differ from domestic law, 
  especially regarding enforcement and adjudication?  Why are states interested in 
  international law?  (165-69) 
 
7. The Suez Canal Crisis  What precipitated the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956?  What efforts 
  were made to solve the problem peacefully?  How and why did Israel get involved?  What 
  role was played by the United Nations?  What is the purpose of U.N. Security Council 
  Resolution 242?  (169-71) 
 
8.  U.N. Peacekeeping and Collective Security  Identify some of the formal steps taken in 
  the development of international law and collective security?  How does the U.N. Security 
  Council work?  What are some of the difficulties in defining aggression?  What is 
  preventive diplomacy?  Why was U.N. collective security used in 1990 for the first time 
  since the Korean War?  What are some of the remaining practical limitations on collective 
  security?  (171-74) 
 
9. Conflicts in the Middle East  Identify three factors at the root of so much Middle East 
  conflict?  What miscalculations led to the Iran-Iraq War?  (174-75) 
 
10. The Questions of Nationalism  How may “nation” be defined?  What are the 
  implications of the word being both descriptive and prescriptive?  How did this idea arise 
  and spread?  How has decolonization changed the nineteenth century model?  What role 
  has been played by the “pan” movements?  (175-77) 
 
11. The Arab-Israeli Conflicts  Identify the six wars produced by the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
   What are some of the ambiguities of Resolution 242?  What was the superpower role in 
  the Yom Kippur War?  Why were these wars generally short?  (178-81) 
 
12. The 1991 Gulf War and Its Aftermath  What reasons did Iraq have for invading Kuwait? 
   Why did the United States respond as it did?  Was the war necessary?  What did it 
  solve?  How did it affect the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian situation?   The Wye River 
  Memorandum (1998) between Israel and the Palestinians was intended to facilitate 
  implementation of the Interim Agreement of 1995.  It called upon each side to take 
  measures to guarantee the security of the other and provided for the phased transfer of 
  powers and authority from Israel to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the Jericho 
  area.  What factors contributed to the breakdown of the peace process?  (181-84) 
 
13. How did the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict change in 2000 and 2001?  How did 
  the international context of the conflict change?  What have been some of the effects of 
  Saddam Hussein’s removal from power?  How do the three levels of analysis continue to 
  interact?  (184-86) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  GLOBALIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE 
 
Outline 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  (191-92) 
 1. Fault Line Between Those with Skills and Mobility and Those Without 
 2, New Competition Among States in “Geo-Economics” [cf. Walter Russell Mead’s 
  millennial capitalism 
B. THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION  (192-94) 
 1. Globalization: Worldwide Networks of Interdependence 
  a. It does not imply universality 
 2. It Has Made National Boundaries More Porous 
  a. Homogenization does not follow from globalization 
 3. Three Dimensions: 
 4. Environmental 
  a. Smallpox 
  b. Black Death 
  c. HIV/AIDS 
  d. Exotic flora and fauna 
  e. Global climate change 
 5. Military 
  a. World-straddling alliances 
  b. Missiles 
 6. Social 
  a. American population 
  b. Four great world religions 
  c. Spread of constitutional arrangements and political ideas 
C. WHAT’S NEW ABOUT TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GLOBALIZATION?  (194-95) 
 1. Network Effects 
  a. Joseph Stiglitz: Spillover Effects 
 2. Thickness 
 3. Quickness 
 4. Direct Public Participation 
  a. Pluralization 
   
Study Questions 
 
1. Dimensions of Globalization  What is meant by “geo-economics”?  Why does 
  globalization not imply universality?  Identify its three chief dimensions.  What is 
  happening with the pace of environmental change?  What are some of the features of 
  political globalization?  (191-94) 
 
2. Identify four effects of contemporary globalization that reveal it to be “farther, faster, 
  cheaper and deeper,” according to Thomas Friedman.   What is some of the evidence of 
  increasing inequality between people in the richest countries and people in the poorest? 
   [In The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998), David S. Landes, a Harvard economic 
  historian, maintained that the income difference between Switzerland and Madagascar is 
  about 400:1].  What have been some of the effects of the market forces unleashed by the 
  Industrial Revolution?  What is meant by “useful inefficiencies”?  (194-97) 
 
3. The Concept of Interdependence  How do statesmen and analysts differ in their use of political 
words?  As an analytic word, what is interdependence?  What are some sources of 
interdependence?  Why did the collapse of the Soviet bring relief in the West rather than cause 
anxiety?  Why did the cost of bread rise in the 1970s?  What happened when the United States 
decided in 1973 to stop exporting soybeans to Japan?  Why is the distribution of benefits a “zero-
sum game”?  Why does the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs become blurred?  
Why does classical balance of power theory not fit economic interdependence very well?  (197-
200) 
 
4. Distinguish between short-term sensitivity and long-term vulnerability.  Identify three factors 
involved by vulnerability.  What was behind the error in Lester Brown’s prediction that the United 
States would be dependent on imports of 10 of the basic 13 industrial raw materials by 1985?  
When the United States became dependent on imported Japanese capital to balance its federal 
budget in the 1980s, did this give Japan either a political or a trade advantage?  How can 
manipulation of asymmetries be a source of power in the politics of interdependence?  What is 
linkage?  What are trade-offs?   Even though Canada is more dependent on the United States 
than vice versa, what accounts for its ability to prevail in a number of disputes between them?  
What is the effect of pacts such as NAFTA?  (200-205) 
 
5. Leadership in the World Economy  Why did hegemony over the international economy shift 
from Great Britain to the United States?  What crisis occurred due to the American unwillingness 
to live up to its new responsibilities?  What are some of the key institutions of the post-WWII 
international economic regime?  How do the ideas of realism and complex interdependence 
describe the US/China relationship? 
 
6. The Politics of Oil  What were the characteristics of the international oil regime in 1960?  What 
changes were evident as a result of the Arab oil embargo of 1973?  Describe three explanations 
of the changes in the international oil regime.  What are the particulars of each?  Why was the oil 
weapon not more effective?  (205-13)  
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION, 
TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS, AND THE DIFFUSION OF 
POWER 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Power and the Information Revolution  Why have governments always worried about the flow 
and control of information?  How did Gutenberg’s invention of movable type change the world?  
What is the key characteristic of the information revolution, which is sometimes called the Third 
Industrial Revolution?  What changes were wrought by the first two industrial revolutions?  
What is meant by the management of scale?  Why does productivity growth lag?  What were the 
political effects of mass communication and broadcasting?  How and why have they changed?  
(217-21) 
 
2. Sovereignty and Control  What do Peter Drucker and the Tofflers mean by cyber-feudalism?  
The term “cybernetics” -- which was introduced by the scientist and philosopher, Norbert Wiener, 
in the 1940s -- is derived from the Greek root kubernetes [pilot or steersman], as governor is 
derived from the Latin equivalent.  What are the implications of the communications revolution for 
national identity, loyalty, and sovereignty?  What changed as a result of medieval trade fairs (e.g., 
Scarborough Fair)?   
 
NOTE:  Serfs who escaped to live and work in the medieval free cities won their freedom after a 
year and a day: “Stadtluft macht frei” [city airs makes (one) free].  Hitler’s concentration camps 
changed the slogan to “Arbeit macht frei” [work makes one free].  The lex mercatoria [merchant 
or market law] was developed as a private set of rules, complete with courts, for conducting 
business.  In The Mystery of Capital, the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto examines the 
development of property protections on the American frontier and commends the American model 
for land reform in Third World areas.   
 
The ideas of complex interdependence and transnational actors are not at all new.  Cf. Adda B. 
Bozeman on the origins of the Hanseatic League in Politics and Culture in International History 
(1960):   
 
“The objective and subjective factors that had distinguished the Western 
European approach to peace and unity in religious, political, and intellectual 
matters, and had given rise, in consequence, to the permanent establishment of 
the three great concerts or “virtues” of the Church, the Empire, and the University 
of Paris, and the ad hoc assembling of all European interests at Constance were 
operative also in the field of Europe’s economic life where they called forth a 
remarkable movement toward federalism among the rising groups of townsmen 
and merchants.” 
 
“This impulse toward corporate unity was particularly strong north of the Alps, 
where the absence of a protective secular international order was felt more 
keenly than in Italy.  Here, in the midst of political confusion, where travelling 
merchants had long been in the habit of carrying their special merchant law with 
them, and where cities had evolved their own law in protection of their special 
peace, certain German towns recorded what may be the most suggestive 
chapter in the annals of inter-European constitutionalism when they formed the 
transterritorial League of Hanseatic cities.” 
 
“The North European scene in which the German merchants operated before the 
twelfth century . . . presented greater hazards and greater opportunities for 
adventurous action than the southern region.  East of the river Elbe spread the 
vast territorial expanse of rural, pagan Slavdom.  Here the pioneering merchants 
are known to have conducted a border trade as early as the ninth century A.D.  
This penetration, later supported by organized campaigns of colonization and 
Christianization, brought the entering Germans into contact with local rulers 
under whose protection they proceeded to found and build numerous towns.  
Lübeck, renowned in later centuries as the leader of the Hanseatic League, was 
the first of these settlements that pointed, chainlike, toward the magnetic market 
of Novgorod.  From the eastern ports of the “new” Germany the companies 
pushed to the farthest Baltic coast, gained economic control over the Baltic Sea, 
and established a direct route between these northern waters and the Black Sea 
by traveling on the Oder or the Vistula to Cracow, and thence on the Pruth or 
Dniester to their southern ports of destination.”   
. . . . 
“The recognition granted the Germans abroad coincided with the constitutional 
status that the trading companies had evolved for themselves, for all Germans 
who were natives of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation were actually 
organized at this time as  universitas communium mercatorium.  This first all-
German universitas, the predecessor of the Hanseatic League, united the 
merchants of over thirty towns, from Cologne and Utrecht in the west to Reval in 
the east, and had its headquarters on the island of Gotland, then known as the 
axis and most celebrated market of Europe.”  (505-06) 
 
3. How does the transition from the medieval to the modern political world illustrate the resistance, 
slowness, or lag of political institutions in responding to change?  Identify some of “the growing 
list of problems that are difficult to control within sovereign borders.”  How do competing 
sovereignties affect border control, national security, and human rights?  How have human rights 
issues effectively modified the UN rule against intervention?  How do cross-cutting identities 
(like “cross-cutting cleavages”) and cosmopolitan identities complicate the existing mix of 
loyalties?  How have diaspora communities (exiles, such as the Iraqis in America who voted in 
the 2005 election) used Internet to stay politically involved with their home country?  What are 
“flash movements” and James Rosenau’s “fragmegration?”  (221-25) 
 
4. What are transnational actors?  How do they add to the blurring of foreign and domestic politics 
even within the bureaucracy?  What economic interests in America were not unhappy that OPEC 
raised oil prices?  What is one of the distinguishing characteristics if complex interdependence?  
Give some examples of NGOs.  Define terrorism.  How does it compare with piracy in an earlier 
era?  How important is the role of states?  (225-231) 
 
5. Information and Power among States  Does the information revolution tend to equalize power 
among nations?  What trends aid the already large and powerful?  What is meant by the “paradox 
of plenty?”  What does the author mean when he writes: “Now credibility is the crucial resource,” 
and “Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility?” 
 Why are most information shapers democracies?  Why are closed systems more costly?  What 
conclusions does the author draw about the information revolution?  (231-38) 
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CHAPTER NINE:  A NEW WORLD ORDER? 
 
Outline 
 
A. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE FUTURE  (242-47) 
1. Self-Help Realm 
2. Arnold Toynbee: Nation-State vs. Fission 
3. Large Territorial State as the Post-Westphalian Norm 
4. Five Alternatives 
a. World Federalism 
b. Functionalism 
c. Regionalism: Jean Monnet, Schumann Plan, Treaty of Rome (EU) 
d. Ecologism: Richard Falk 
e. Cyber-Feudalism: Peter Drucker, the Tofflers, Esther Dyson 
(1) Crosscutting Communities 
(2) Terrorists 
(3) Thomas Hobbes 
5. Political Goals: Physical Security, Economic Well-Being, Communal Identity 
6. Changing Context 
a. Divisiveness: Religious and Nationalistic Cleavages 
b. Economic Integration vs. Political Fragmentation 
7. Communications and Diplomacy 
a. CNN 
b. Synchronization 
8. “Narrowcasting” of Information 
a. Marshall McLuhan’s Global Village  
B. THE END OF HISTORY OR THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?  (247-49) 
1. Francis Fukuyama’s End of History 
a. Deep Ideological Cleavages 
b. Success of Liberal Capitalism 
c. Post-Cold War Return of History 
2. Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations 
a. Toynbee’s Civilizations 
3. Critique 
4. Nationalism 
5. East vs. West Europe 
6. Explanations 
a. Role of Economic Growth 
b. Democratic Processes 
c. Regional Institutions 
7. Persistence of National Identity 
a. French and Germans 
b. Immigration 
c. Sovereignty 
C. TECHNOLOGY AND THE DIFFUSION OF POWER  (249-51) 
1. Diffusion of Power 
a. Erosion of Control 
b. Trends 
2. Consequences 
a. Islands of Democratic Peace vs. a New Feudalism 
3. Benign Vision: NGOs 
4. MNCs 
5. Confusion of Identity 
6. Protectionism 
D. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION  (251-53) 
1. Malign Vision 
a. WMDs 
b. Proliferation 
2. Nuclear Club 
3. Cold War Obstacles to Nuclear Proliferation 
a. Cold War Alliance Structure 
b. Superpower Cooperation 
(1) Nuclear Suppliers Group 
c. Treaties and Institutions 
(1) India Cheated 
4. Collapse of Soviet Alliance Guarantees 
E. TRANSNATIONAL THREATS AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY  (253-54) 
1. “Failsafe” Devices 
a. Volatility of Proliferation 
b. Fissile Materials 
2. Biological Agents 
3. Transnational Terrorism 
a. Aum Shinriko 
4. “Netwars” 
5. Inadequacy of Deterrence 
a. State Terrorism 
b. Panama’s Manuel Noriega 
F. A NEW WORLD ORDER?  (254-55) 
1. Order 
a. Realists 
b. Liberals 
c. Constructivists 
2. Conspiracy Theories 
3. Lack of Definition 
G. FUTURE CONFIGURATIONS OF POWER  (255-57) 
1. Rapid Power Transitions 
2. Multipolarity 
3. Unipolar Hegemony 
a. Tripolar Economic Power 
4. Transnational Relations 
5. Three Economic Blocs: Europe, Asia, North America 
6. Multilevel Interdependence 
7. No American Hegemony 
H. THE PRISON OF OLD CONCEPTS  (257-59) 
1. Sui Generis [Self-Generating] System 
2. Realist View 
a. Erosion of Classical Conception 
3. Liberal View 
4. Security Council and the Doctrine of Collective Security 
5. Unforeseen Rise of Bipolarity 
6. Issue of Self-Determination 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID WORLD ORDER  (259-60) 
1. Human Rights 
a. Sanctions against South Africa 
b. Helsinki Accords 
2. Armed Multilateral Intervention 
3. U. N. Charter, Chapter VII 
4. What Realists and Liberals Must Recognize 
J. THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE  (260-61) 
1. Change 
a. Thucydides 
b. Kant 
2. Thinking about Different Ideal Types 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Why did Arnold Toynbee believe that the nation-state and the split atom could not coexist on the 
same planet?  Identify five alternative futures.  What do people want from their political 
institutions?  How is the context of world politics changing?  What is meant by “narrowcasting”?  
(238-43) 
 
2. Compare and contrast the theories of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington.  What are 
some of the criticisms?  How does the author account for the virtual absence of intrastate conflict 
in Europe?  Is nationalism dead in Europe?  (243-45) 
 
3. What third vision of the future does the author offer?  Compare the benign with the malign vision?  
How is transnational investment [Mead’s millennial capitalism] helping to confuse identities?  
What were the chief obstacles to nuclear proliferation during the Cold War?  Why is deterrence 
inadequate to protect from terrorist threats?  What then is required?  (245-50) 
 
4. At a time of rapid power transitions, what future scenarios are usually invoked?  In “The Prison of 
Old Concepts,” what does the author find salvageable?  What does he mean by a “hybrid world 
order”?  Why must we understand both the realist and the liberal views of world politics?  (250-
56) 
 
Review 
 
Arnold Toynbee   large territorial state and the five alternatives 
Richard Falk   what people want from their political institutions 
economic integration and political fragmentation   Francis Fukuyama 
Samuel P. Huntington  East vs. West Europe  diffusion of power 
Marshall McLuhan  Cold War obstacles to nuclear proliferation 
rapid power transitions  future configurations of power  
